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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade or so, federal and state education 
policymakers embraced the use of value-added models 
(VAMs) to evaluate teachers’ performance and make high-
stakes employment decisions (e.g., tenure, merit pay, 
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termination of employment). VAMs are complicated 
statistical models that attempt to estimate a teacher’s 
contribution to student test scores, particularly those in 
mathematics and reading. Educational researchers, as 
well as many teachers and unions, however, have objected 
to the use of VAMs noting that these models fail to 
adequately account for variables outside of teachers’ 
control that contribute to a student’s education 
performance. Subsequently, many teachers challenged the 
use of VAMs through the courts. This article assesses those 
challenges. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 In March of 2017, William “Bill” Sanders passed 
away in Tennessee.1 To most policymakers outside of 
education (and many within it) he was a relatively 
unknown statistician. His work in education policy 
started far away from schoolhouses. Indeed, after he 
received his degree in statistics at the University of 
Tennessee, he began assessing the impact of radiation on 
farm animals.2  
But his career trajectory changed markedly. In 
1982, after reading a newspaper article about how 
Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander sought a model of 
teacher compensation that would pay teachers for 
performance, Mr. Sanders concluded he had the answer.3 
He wrote to Alexander explaining that he developed a 
statistical model that could determine who the “best” 
teachers were—a so-called “value-added” model (e.g., the 
Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) 
                                               
1 Kevin Carey, The Little-Known Statistician Who Taught Us 
to Measure Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/upshot/the-little-known-
statistician-who-transformed-education.html [https://perma. 
cc/2VBF-CZWY]. 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
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which is more generally known as the Education Value-
Added Assessment (EVAAS)).4 This model estimates a 
teacher’s contribution to student achievement on 
standardized tests,5 and it formed the basis for his 
private company that developed algorithms for the 
models.6 Tennessee ultimately incorporated value added 
models into policies and laws, linking high-stakes 
employment decisions and evaluation to student test 
scores.7 
 Mr. Sanders’s models—sparked by this random 
collision of events—has had profound impact on national 
educational policy. In 2009, President Obama’s Race to 
the Top (RttT) program conditioned state receipt of 
federal education dollars on states’ use of VAMs to 
evaluate and make employment decisions for teachers. 
States seeking much-needed federal money during the 
                                               
4 Id. VAMs have a policy history that precede Mr. Sanders’s 
adoption of the term in education. They had been used in 
economics since the 1960s. See, e.g, Douglas Harris, Would 
Accountability Based on Teacher Value Added Be Smart 
Policy? An Examination of the Statistical Properties and Policy 
Alternatives, 4 J. EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 319, 321 (2009). Yet 
Sanders is widely credited as the one who popularized the use 
of VAMs for educational accountability. E.g., Carey supra note 
1. 
5 E.g., EDWARD WILEY, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO VALUE 
ADDED ASSESSMENT 5 (2006) https://nepc.colorado.edu/ 
publication/a-practitioners-guide-value-added-assessment-
educational-policy-studies-laboratory-resea [https://perma.cc/ 
EH6R-S7QN]. 
6 SAS® EVAAS® FOR K-12, https://www.sas.com/en_si/ 
software/evaas.html [https://perma.cc/65TE-VEFG] (crediting 
the development of this particular model sold by a private 
company to Mr. Sanders).  
7 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-302(a)(2)(C), 49-5-503(4) (2016); 
TENN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., TEACHER AND ADMINISTRATOR 
POLICY § 5.201 (2017) (statutory and regulatory framework 
delegating authority to state department of education to 
develop policy for evaluation and further linking that 
evaluation to tenure determinations).   
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“Great Recession” eagerly complied.8 As a consequence, 
VAMs became codified in state teacher evaluation and 
employment laws across the country.9 
 Despite their widespread adoption, the use of 
these statistical models in improving public schools is a 
source of considerable debate in law and policy. Some 
scholars applaud their use, arguing that they provide a 
clear measure of a teacher’s worth and address a 
persistent policy dilemma: How to improve the quality of 
our public school teachers.10 Detractors insist that a 
teacher’s value is much more than the measure of test 
scores and, more importantly, that VAMs are statistically 
flawed.11 Critics note that VAMs fail to account for the 
complexity of teaching and cannot accurately control for 
the impact of other variables (e.g., students’ individual 
                                               
8 See generally Rhoda Freelon et al., Overburdened and 
Underfunded: California Public Schools Amidst the Great 
Recession, 2 MULTIDISCIPLINARY J. EDUC. RES., 152 (2012) 
(documenting the impact of the Great Recession on public 
schools in California, but also noting the broader impact of the 
recession on schools and institutions beyond California).   
9 KATHRYN M. DOHERTY & SANDI JACOBS, STATE OF THE STATES 
2013: CONNECT THE DOTS: USING EVALUATIONS OF TEACHER 
EFFECTIVENESS TO INFORM POLICY AND PRACTICE 10 (2013) 
(noting that in 2013 at least 31 states had adopted the use of 
standardized test in their teacher evaluation protocols); see 
also MARK A. PAIGE, BUILDING A BETTER TEACHER: 
UNDERSTANDING VALUE-ADDED MODELS IN THE LAW OF 
TEACHER EVALUATION 15, 16 (2016) (describing the links 
between teacher evaluation systems and teacher employment 
statutes, such as tenure, and warning against such use for 
high-stakes decisions). 
10 See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Conceptual and Empirical Issues 
in the Estimation of Educational Production Functions, 14 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 351, 353 (arguing for the adoption of 
production function models to evaluate teachers). 
11 E.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Can Value-Added Add Value 
to Teacher Evaluation?, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 132, 133 
(placing the use of value added models in the larger policy 
debate about how to improve teacher quality). 
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motivation) that impact student achievement.12 Because 
of these issues, commentators cautioned against the use 
of VAMs in high-stakes employment decisions (e.g. 
termination), noting such use would invite legal action.13 
 Notwithstanding these warnings, many states 
embraced VAMs. Florida, for example, amended their 
teacher evaluation statutes to ensure that VAMs played 
a controlling role in teacher employment status, 
including tenure decisions.14 Teachers and unions almost 
immediately challenged the use of VAMs through legal 
means. Lawsuits ranged from violations of the Federal 
Constitution15 to assertions that requirements to use 
VAMs violated the non-delegability doctrine.16 Many of 
these received widespread attention in the popular 
press.17  
                                               
12 Id.; see also SEAN P. CORCORAN, CAN TEACHERS BE 
EVALUATED BY THEIR STUDENTS’ TEST SCORES? SHOULD THEY 
BE? THE USE OF VALUE-ADDED MEASURES OF TEACHER 
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 22 (2010). 
13 PAIGE, supra note 9, at 22 n.28; see also Preston C. Green III 
et al., The Legal and Policy Implication of Value-Added 
Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 15–16 
(2012). 
14 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.22(1)(c)(5) (West 2013) 
(connecting teacher salary to an evaluation system that 
requires use of VAMs).  
15 E.g., Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(alleging use of VAMs violated substantive and procedural due 
process clauses, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment).  
16 E.g., State ex rel. Stapleton v. Skandera, 346 P.3d 1191, 1194 
(N.M. App. 2015). 
17 E.g., Peter Greene, Over a Year Ago a Federal Court Struck 
Down VAM: Why Are We Still Using it to Evaluate Teachers?, 
FORBES (June 25, 2018, 08:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/petergreene/2018/06/25/over-a-year-ago-a-federal-court-
struck-down-vam-why-are-we-still-using-it-to-evaluate-teachers/ 
[https://perma.cc/AA4M-NRQ5]; Patricia MacGregor-Mendoza, 
Court Finds Teacher Evaluation System Flawed, LAS CRUCES 
SUN NEWS (May 26, 2017, 07:17 PM), https://www.lcsun-
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 It has been almost ten years since Race to the Top 
brought Mr. Sander’s idea of VAMs from Tennessee to a 
national scale, and it seems an appropriate moment to 
assess their legal and policy ramifications. Indeed, as we 
note, the use of VAMs has triggered a wave of litigation 
and policy change that continues today. Many states 
continue to use VAMs, while others have reduced their 
use under new federal laws.18 Thus, assessing the legal 
and policy landscape forms the basis of this article. 
 Generally speaking, three lines of legal challenges 
have emerged. First, some are grounded in the 
substantive Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment, arguing that the laws do 
not pass rational basis scrutiny.19 Second, a line of cases 
challenges the authority or jurisdiction of a particular 
agency (e.g., state Department of Education) to enact 
evaluation regulations or laws that use VAMs. Third, 
some cases advance what we refer to as “process” 
arguments. These contend that the use of VAMs violates 
some agreed-upon or standing procedural terms found in 
the Procedural Due Process Clause or collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs). As we note, plaintiffs 
have captured the most success (although not always) on 
this third line of argument. 
 That litigants have experienced more success 
arguing VAMs offend certain procedural protections 
comports with common understanding of procedural due 
                                               
news.com/story/opinion/2017/05/26/court-finds-teacher-
evaluation-system-flawed/102219102/ [https://perma.cc/ESS8-
SXWX];Valerie Strauss, Judge Calls Evaluation of N.Y. 
Teacher “Arbitrary” and “Capricious” in Case Against New U.S. 
Secretary of Education, WASH. POST (May 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/ 
2016/05/10/judge-calls-evaluation-of-n-y-teacher-arbitrary-
and-capricious-in-case-against-new-u-s-secretary-of-
education/ [https://perma.cc/Y645-2T82]. 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See, e.g., Cook, 792 F.3d at 1298, 1300.  
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process. At its core, procedural due process ensures 
“fundamental fairness” when the government moves to 
take away a protected interest, such as employment. 
While courts generally have not overruled a legislature’s 
policy choice to use VAMs as violative of the substantive 
due process, they (including a federal appeals court case) 
have questioned the wisdom of the legislature’s 
decision.20 Where they have overturned the use of VAMs, 
they have done so on procedural grounds.21 This allows 
courts to stay within “their lane” and avoid jurisdictional 
overreach into the policy area.  
 The article is organized as follows. Part I 
overviews VAMs, their link to teacher evaluation and 
employment, and the controversy surrounding their use, 
especially as a factor in high-stakes employment 
decisions. Part II provides the most current assessment 
of cases where the statistical controversy has led to legal 
action. Part III discusses the recent policy and legal 
developments with respect the use of VAMs in evaluation 
that have occurred because changes in federal education 
law. In conclusion, we note that VAMs have receded, 
somewhat, in terms of their role in evaluation and 
employment matters. 
 
 
II. VAMs: Promise and Controversy  
 
A. A Brief History of VAMs in Educational 
Policy  
 
In the simplest of terms, VAMs (e.g., Tennessee’s 
TVAAS) are statistical models used to measure the 
predicted and the actual “value” a teacher “adds” to (or 
detracts from) student achievement from the point at 
which students enter a teacher’s classroom to the point 
students leave. This is typically done using student 
                                               
20 See id. at 1301.  
21 See id. at 1301–02. 
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achievement growth as measured by large-scale 
standardized test scores (i.e., the tests mandated by the 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001). The models 
attempt to statistically control for outside variables, 
including students’ prior test performance, and student-
level background variables (e.g., whether students are 
eligible for free-and-reduced lunches).22  
The most widely used VAM is the EVAAS, 
developed and used in Tennessee.23 EVAAS comes in 
different versions for different states (e.g., the EVAAS in 
Ohio, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the PVAAS in 
Pennsylvania, the TVAAS in Tennessee, and the 
TxVAAS in Texas) and different ones based on large and 
small school districts (e.g., located within Arkansas, 
Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and Virginia). For each 
consumer, EVAAS modelers choose one of two 
sophisticated statistical models.24  
Using these models, student growth scores are 
aggregated at the teacher or classroom level to yield 
teacher-level value-added estimates. Depending on where 
                                               
22 See e.g., Sean Corcoran & Dan Goldhaber, Value Added and 
Its Uses: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit, 8 EDUC. 
FIN. & POL’Y 418, 421 (2013). Other variables include things 
such as, English language learners (ELLs), gifted, receiving 
special education services, and classroom and school-level 
variables (e.g., class sizes, school resources, school leadership). 
23 The EVAAS is advertised as “the most comprehensive 
reporting package of value-added metrics available in the 
educational market” in that the EVAAS offers states, districts, 
and schools “precise, reliable and unbiased results that go far 
beyond what other simplistic [value-added] models found in the 
market today can provide.” SAS® EVAAS ® FOR K-12, 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/software/evaas.html [https://perma.cc/ 
76AY-G47W]. 
24 For a comprehensive statistical summation of the various 
models and options available, see WHITE PAPER: SAS® 
EVAAS® FOR K12 STATISTICAL MODELS, https://www.sas. 
com/content/dam/SAS/en_us/doc/whitepaper1/sas-evaas-k12-
statistical-models-107411.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5EW-WCB6]. 
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teachers’ EVAAS estimates fall, as compared to similar 
teachers to whom they are compared (e.g., within 
districts) at the same time, teachers’ value-added 
determinations are made.25 Thereafter, EVAAS modelers 
make relativistic comparisons and rank teachers 
hierarchically along a continuum.26 Teachers whose 
students grow significantly more than the average and/or 
surpass projected levels of growth are identified as 
“adding value”; teachers whose students grow 
significantly less and/or fall short of projected levels are 
identified as “detracting value.”27 Teachers whose 
students grow at rates that are not statistically different 
from average (i.e., falling within one standard deviation 
of the mean) are classified as Not Detectibly Different 
(NDD).28 
  
1. The Rise of VAMs in National Education 
Policy: Race to the Top  
 
In 2007, TVAAS/EVAAS entered the national 
education policy discussion when developer Dr. William 
L. Sanders shared his research with Congress. 
Specifically, he testified before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Education and the 
Workforce on how TVAAS could improve teacher 
                                               
25 For a general overview of the use of VAMs and the concepts 
noted herein, see WILEY, supra note 5.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.; Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Clarin Collins, The SAS 
Education Value-Added Assessment System (SAS® EVAAS®) 
in the Houston Independent School District (HISD): Intended 
and Unintended Consequences, 20 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
ARCHIVES,  no. 12, Apr. 2012, at 1, 7 n.2.  
28  WILEY, supra note 5; Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, supra 
note 27, at 7 n.2; see, e.g., WILLIAM L. SANDERS, COMPARISONS 
AMONG VARIOUS EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT VALUE-ADDED 
MODELS 18 (2006).  
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accountability and promote educational reform.29 His 
testimony spurred the U.S. Department of Education’s 
piloting of VAMs.30  
The use of VAMs nationally grew under the Race 
to the Top program. By way of background, RttT was a 
competitive federal grant program that amounted to an 
injection of $4.35 billion to selected states to support 
educational reform efforts.31 Receipt of the grant was 
conditioned on states developing teacher evaluation laws 
and policy that used VAMs.32 States that attached 
relatively more serious consequences (e.g., employment 
status) to teachers’ VAM-based output were viewed more 
favorably than those that did not.33 High-stakes 
consequences included, but were not limited to: teachers’ 
permanent files being flagged, thus preventing teachers 
from changing jobs within states; the revocation of 
teacher licenses; teacher tenure; salary increases, 
decreases, and merit pay; and teacher probation and 
termination.34 
Beyond RttT, the federal government used other 
mechanisms to embed VAMs in state evaluation and 
employment matters as a matter of law and policy. In 
2011, the federal government required that states adopt 
the accountability practices discussed above 
                                               
29 CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON & JANELLE BARLAGE, INFLUENCE: 
A STUDY OF THE FACTORS SHAPING EDUCATION POLICY 41 
(2016), https://secure.edweek.org/media/influence_study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/346S-HJSX]. 
30 Id.  
31 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP FACT SHEET (2009), 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/factsheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/35GG-Y3HM]. 
32 Id. 
33 Arne Duncan, Sec’y, Dep’t of Educ., Remarks at The Race to 
the Top Program Announcement: The Race to the Top Begins 
(July 4, 2009), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/race-top-begins 
[https://perma.cc/3RD5-RP7A]. 
34 See generally PAIGE, supra note 9 (noting that VAMs became 
required factors for employment decisions). 
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(notwithstanding if a state applied or received RttT 
funds) to secure waivers from the penalties that they 
would incur for non-compliance with the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001.35 NCLB, passed with bipartisan 
support in 2001, required 100 percent of students to 
attain proficiency in math and reading state 
standardized tests.36 The utopian goal has been widely 
criticized as impractical.37 Nevertheless, the federal 
government required states to submit waivers to escape 
the punitive measures of non-compliance (e.g., 
intervention of state authorities in the operation of local 
schools). More specifically, these waivers buttressed the 
core policy drivers of RttT by continuing to incorporate 
student test scores as a means to hold teachers 
accountable for their “value added,” or lack thereof.38  
The cumulative impact of RttT and federal 
waivers on the use of VAMs in teacher evaluations was 
substantial. By 2014, 40 states and Washington, D.C., 
                                               
35 KEVIN CLOSE ET AL., STATE-LEVEL ASSESSMENTS AND 
TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEMS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE 
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: SOME STEPS IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION 5 (Nat’l Educ. Policy Ctr. ed., 2018), 
https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PB%20C
lose-Beardsley-Collins_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG4N-B8N2]. 
36 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 
1001, 115 Stat. 1425 (requiring all students obtain proficiency 
in specified test areas) (repealed 2015).  
37 See, e.g., Bruce Meredith & Mark A. Paige, Opinion, 
Rethinking Federal Role in Education Makes Sense. Trump’s 
Plan Does Not, ATLANTA J.-CONST.: GET SCHOOLED (Oct. 3, 
2018, 11:15 AM) https://www.myajc.com/blog/get-schooled/ 
opinion-rethinking-fed-education-role-makes-sense-trump-plan-
does-not/T19cWlKAznnDpcoxmvr1nJ/ [https://perma.cc/S3J4-
B4FW] (characterizing the NCLB goal of proficiency as 
unrealistic, especially in light of the lack of support from the 
federal government to education and other important public 
policy areas that impact education success, like housing and 
health care).  
38 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 8. 
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(80%) were using or still developing some type of VAM for 
increased teacher accountability purposes.39 While state 
department of education leaders recognized and 
encouraged the use of VAMs, they did not develop 
support mechanisms and resources to help teachers 
understand and subsequently use their VAM-based data 
to improve their effectiveness.40 Put differently, 
information from VAMs was not actionable. This 
disconnect has been the source of serious contention and 
concern about the VAM-based teacher and educational 
reform enterprise. 
 
B. Statistical and Practical Controversies 
 
Significant statistical and practical concerns 
surround VAMs, and these are best understood with 
reference to the professional guidelines that govern 
education and psychological professions, the Standards 
for Educational and Psychological Testing41 (hereinafter 
“Standards”). These issues include, but are not limited to: 
(1) reliability, (2) validity, (3) bias, (4) transparency, and 
(5) fairness, with emphasis also on (6) whether VAMs are 
being used to make consequential decisions using 
concrete (e.g., not arbitrary) evidence, and (7) unintended 
consequences. These are discussed below.  
  
1. Reliability 
 
Reliability is the degree to which test- or 
measurement-based scores “are consistent over repeated 
applications of a measurement procedure (e.g., a VAM) 
and hence and inferred to be dependable and consistent” 
                                               
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 14. 
41 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS’N, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N & 
NAT’L COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUC., STANDARDS FOR 
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (2014) 
[hereinafter STANDARDS].  
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for the individuals (e.g., teachers) to whom the scores 
pertain.42 VAMs are reliable when within-group (same 
school or district) VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness 
are more or less consistent over time, from one year to 
the next, regardless of the type of students and subject 
areas teachers teach. Consistency over time is typically 
captured using particular statistical tools such as 
standard errors, reliability coefficients per se, and 
generalizability coefficients, among others.43 These 
situate and make explicit VAM estimates and their 
(sometimes sizeable) errors and, importantly, help others 
understand the errors that come along with VAM 
estimates. 
Research has documented serious concerns with 
respect to VAM reliability (or intemporal stability). 
Indeed, teachers classified as “effective” one year might 
have a 25–59% chance of being classified as “ineffective” 
the next year, or vice versa, with other permutations 
possible.44 If a teacher who is classified as a “strong” 
teacher this year is classified as a “weak” teacher next 
year, and vice versa, this casts doubt on the reliability of 
VAMs for the purpose of identifying and making high-
stakes decisions regarding teachers. Accordingly, across 
VAM, reliability is a hindrance, especially when 
unreliable measures are to be used for consequential 
purposes like decisions to terminate or deny tenure. 
  
  
                                               
42 Id. at 222–23.    
43 Id. at 33. 
44  For a comprehensive overview of these concepts, see José 
Felipe Martínez et al., Approaches for Combining Multiple 
Measures of Teacher Performance: Reliability, Validity, and 
Implications for Evaluation Policy, 38 EDUC. EVALUATION & 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 738-56 (2016); see also Peter Z. Schochet & 
Hanley S. Chiang, What are Error Rates for Classifying 
Teacher and School Performance Using Value-Added Models?, 
38 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 142-71 (2013).  
14
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol13/iss2/4
TENNESSEE’S NATIONAL IMPACT 
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y  523 (2019) 
 
[537] 
2. Validity 
 
Validity is “the degree to which evidence and 
theory support the interpretations of test scores for [the] 
proposed uses of tests.”45 It is measured by “the degree to 
which all the accumulated evidence supports the 
intended interpretation of [the test-based] scores for 
[their] proposed use[s].”46 Put another way, validity asks: 
Does the model assess what it is supposed to assess?47 
Accordingly, one must be able to support validity 
arguments with quantitative or qualitative evidence that 
the data derived allows for accurate inferences.  
There are various means to assess validity, but of 
particular focus for researchers is validity as it concerns 
“concurrent-related evidences.”48 This helps to assess, for 
example, whether teachers who post large and small 
                                               
45 STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 11.  
46 Id. at 14.  
47 There are sub areas of validity that have been the subject of 
considerable research as it relates to VAMs.  
These are: (1) content-related evidence of validity; (2) 
concurrent-related evidence of validity; (3) predictive-related 
evidence of validity; and (4) consequence-related evidence of 
validity. See Michael T. Kane, Validating the Interpretations 
and Uses of Test Scores, 50 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 1, 2, 8 
(2013); see generally Samuel Messick, Validity, 3 J. EDUC. 
MEASUREMENT 1, 8–103 (1989). However, while all these 
evidences of validity help to support construct-related evidence 
of validity, in VAM research most researchers rely on 
gathering concurrent-related evidence of validity. 
48 E.g., Edward Sloat, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Jessica 
Holloway, Different Teacher-Level Effectiveness Estimates, 
Different Results: Inter-Model Concordance Across Six 
Generalized Value-Added Models (VAMs), 30 EDUC. 
ASSESSMENT EVALUATION & ACCOUNTABILITY 367, 372 (2018); 
see also Pam Grossman et al., The Test Matters: The 
Relationship Between Classroom Observation Scores and 
Teacher Value Added on Multiple Types of Assessment, 43 
EDUC. RESEARCHER 293, 293-303 (2014). 
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value-added gains or losses over time are the same 
teachers deemed effective or ineffective, respectively, 
over the same period using other independent 
quantitative and qualitative measures of teacher 
effectiveness. Other measures might include supervisors’ 
observational scores. If all measures line up and 
theoretically validate one another, then confidence in 
them as independent measures increases.49 If all 
indicators point in different directions, something may be 
wrong with either or both indicators (the VAM tool or 
observational scores, or both).50  
Researchers have questioned whether measures 
of teacher value-added are substantively related to at 
least one other criterion of teacher effectiveness (e.g., 
teacher observational or student survey indicators).51 
Moreover, they question whether the concurrent-related 
evidence of validity that does exist is strong or 
substantive enough to warrant valid inference-making. 
 
3. Bias 
 
Bias pertains to the validity of the inferences that 
stakeholders draw from test-based scores.52 Specific to 
                                               
49 Kane, supra note 47, at 6–8, 37, 40, 64. 
50 Id.  
51 E.g., Morgan S. Polikoff & Andrew C. Porter, Instructional 
Alignment as a Measure of Teaching Quality, 36 EDUC. 
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 399, 399–401 (2014); Tanner 
LeBaron Wallace, Benjamin Kelcey & Erik Ruzek, What Can 
Student Perception Surveys Tell Us About Teaching? 
Empirically Testing the Underlying Structure of the Tripod 
Student Perception Survey, 53 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1834, 1835, 
1837–38 (2016). 
52 The Standards define bias as follows: as the “construct 
underrepresentation of construct-irrelevant components of test 
scores that differentially affect the performance of different 
groups of test takers and consequently the . . . validity of 
interpretations and uses of their test scores.” STANDARDS, 
supra note 41, at 216. Biased estimates, also known as 
16
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VAMs, unpredictable characteristics (variables outside of 
the control of a teacher or school) of students can bias 
estimates about teachers’ contributions. Student 
characteristics include: students’ individual motivation, 
capability to learn, and levels of academic achievement.53 
Because schools do not randomly assign teachers, these 
variables are not controlled in a way to mitigate bias.54 
Biased results are quite possible, especially when 
relatively homogeneous sets of students (e.g., English 
Language Learners (ELLs), gifted and special education 
students, or free-or-reduced lunch eligible students) are 
non-randomly concentrated into schools, purposefully 
placed into classrooms, or both. 
Statistical models—even the most sophisticated—
cannot control for such bias.55 One influential study 
illustrated VAM-based bias when it found that a 
                                               
systematic error as concerning “[t]he systematic over- or 
under-prediction of criterion performance” are observed when 
said criterion performance varies for “people belonging to 
groups differentiated by characteristics not relevant to the 
criterion performance” of measurement. STANDARDS, supra 
note 41, at 216, 222.  
53 See generally Noelle A. Paufler & Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, 
The Random Assignment of Students into Elementary 
Classrooms: Implications for Value-Added Analyses and 
Interpretations, 51 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 328, 328–62 (2014). 
54 See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd, & Jacob L. 
Vigdor, Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of 
Teacher Effectiveness, J. HUM. RESOURCES 778, 779–82 (2006) 
(noting the various ways teachers are assigned to schools). 
Class assignments in schools are historically a function of a 
host of factors, including: pressure from parents for particular 
class placement and pressure from teachers for placement of 
particular students, especially those who may tend to be 
considered “high-achieving.” Id. at 781. Additionally, 
placement among schools within a district is similarly subject 
to other variables, such as housing patterns. Id.  
55 See, e.g., Paufler & Amrein-Beardsley, supra note 53, at 
335.  
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student’s 5th grade teacher was a better predictor of a 
student’s 4th grade growth than was the student’s 4th 
grade teacher.56 The absurdity of that finding raises 
serious questions about the ability of VAMs to control for 
bias. Notwithstanding, the primary debate raging across 
articles concerns whether statistically controlling for 
potential bias by using complex statistical approaches to 
account for non-random student assignment makes bias 
negligible, or rather “strongly ignorable.”57 
  
4. Transparency 
 
Transparency is defined as the extent to which 
something is accessible and understandable.58 In terms 
of VAMs, this relates to the extent to which VAM-based 
estimates may not make sense to those receiving the 
information. In education, teachers and principals may 
not understand the models being used to evaluate their 
performance. Because of this, they are generally unlikely 
to use the VAM-generated information for formative 
purposes (i.e., as a tool to gather information and change 
practice as soon as possible).59 Practitioners often 
                                               
56 Jesse Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value-added 
Estimation: Selection and Observables and Unobservables, 4 
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 537, 546–47 (2009); Jesse Rothstein, 
Teacher Quality in Educational Production, Q.J. ECON. 175, 
210 (2010). 
57 Sean Reardon & Stephen Raudenbush, Assumptions of 
Value-Added Models for Estimating School Effects, 4 EDUC. 
FIN. & POL’Y 492, 496–97 (2009).  
58 STANDARDS, supra note 44. 
59 Jonathan M. Eckert & Joan Dabrowski, Should Value-Added 
Measures Be Used for Performance Pay?, KAPPAN, May 2010, 
at 88, 89–90; Rachel Gabriel & Jessica Nina Lester, Sentinels 
Guarding the Grail: Value-Added Measurement and the Quest 
for Education Reform, 21 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 
1–30 (2013); Ellen Goldring et al., Make Room Value Added: 
Principals’ Human Capital Decisions and the Emergence of 
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describe value-add data reports as confusing, not 
comprehensive in terms of the key concepts and 
objectives taught, ambiguous regarding teachers’ efforts 
at both the student and composite levels, and often 
received months after students leave teachers’ 
classrooms. 
For example, teachers in Houston, Texas, 
expressed that they are learning little about what they 
did effectively or how they might use their value-added 
data to improve their instruction.60 Teachers in North 
Carolina reported that they were “weakly to moderately” 
familiar with their value-added data.61 Tennessee 
teachers maintained that there was very limited support 
or explanation helping teachers use their value-added 
data to improve upon their practice.62  
Quite apart from the statistical concerns noted 
above, the “black-box” nature of VAMs raises additional 
questions in the field. Indeed, the purported strength of 
VAMs is that they will improve instruction by providing 
a wealth of positive diagnostic information. The models 
are supposed to give practitioners useful, actionable 
information. Yet, if practitioners have problems 
understanding the models, the value (if you will) of VAMs 
is greatly diminished. Unfortunately, statisticians that 
have developed the models make “no apologies for the 
                                               
Teacher Observation Data, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 96, 96–97 
(2015).  
60 Clarin Collins, Houston, We Have a Problem: Teachers Find 
No Value in the SAS Education Value-Added Assessment 
System, 22 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 4, 15, 22 (2014). 
61 Kim Kappler Hewitt, Educator Evaluation Policy That 
Incorporates EVAAS Value-Added Measures: Undermined 
Intentions and Exacerbated Inequities, 23 EDUC. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 11 (2015). 
62 See Eckert & Dabrowski, supra note 59, at 90. 
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fact that [their] methods [are] too complex for most of the 
teachers whose jobs depended on them to understand.”63  
  
5. Fairness 
 
General questions of fairness have been raised 
concerning the use of VAMs, especially in the context of 
high-stakes employment decisions. Fairness is the 
impartiality of “test score interpretations for intended 
use(s) for individuals from all relevant subgroups.”64 But 
issues of fairness arise when a test or test use impacts 
some more than others in unfair or prejudiced, yet often 
consequential ways.65 
Fairness issues are amplified as VAMs are 
applied in the field. Indeed, VAMs are generally only 
directly applicable to teachers who instruct in areas that 
are subjected to standardized tests (typically, math and 
reading).66 States and districts can only produce VAM-
based estimates for approximately 30–40% of all 
teachers.67 The other 60–70%, which sometimes includes 
entire campuses of teachers (e.g., early elementary and 
high school teachers) or teachers who do not teach the 
core subject areas assessed using large-scale 
standardized tests (e.g., mathematics and 
English/language arts), cannot be evaluated or held 
accountable using teacher-level value-added data.68 
Importantly, when districts use this information to make 
                                               
63 Carey, supra note 1, at 13; see also Gabriel & Lester, supra 
note 59, at 20.  
64 STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 219 (emphasis added).  
65 This concern is consistent with the general argument of this 
paper. To wit, courts have sustained objections to the use of 
VAMs where they violate procedural due process, the basic 
“fundamental fairness.” See Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 
1301 (11th Cir. 2015). 
66 E.g., Green et al., supra note 13 (noting that the models only 
apply to 30–40% of teachers). 
67 Id.; see also Gabriel & Lester, supra note 59, at 7.  
68 Green et al., supra note 13, at 15, 27–28.  
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consequential, high-stakes employment decisions the 
unfairness can have considerable consequences. Some 
teachers in certain grades or subject areas experience the 
negative or positive consequences of these VAM-based 
data more than their colleagues.69 
  
6. Consequential Use 
 
Assessing the appropriate use of tests must 
consider the social and ethical concerns70 in addition to 
more sterile concerns about statistical methodology.71 
The Standards recommend ongoing evaluation of both 
the intended and unintended consequences of any test as 
an essential part of any test-based system, including 
those based upon VAMs.72 
Typically, ongoing evaluation of social and ethical 
consequences rests on the shoulders of the governmental 
bodies that mandate such test-based policies.73 In this 
case, local and state education departments would be the 
agencies in charge of assessing the social costs and 
ethical issues associated with the use of VAMs in high-
stakes contexts. This is because they “provide resources 
for a continuing program of research and for 
dissemination of research findings concerning both the 
                                               
69 This has formed the basis of substantive due process claims 
against school districts. E.g., Cook, 792 F.3d 1294 (agreeing 
that the system of Florida that adopted VAM ratings that apply 
to all teachers, including those in non-tested subject areas, was 
unwise and unfair but upholding it under rational basis test).  
70 E.g., Messick, supra note 47, at 8 noting that “[t]he only form 
of validity evidence [typically] bypassed or neglected in these 
traditional formulations is that which bears on the social 
consequences of test interpretation and use.”  
71 See also Kane, supra note 47. 
72 STANDARDS, supra note 41. 
73 Id.  
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positive and the negative effects of the testing 
program.”74  
However, this rarely occurs. The burden typically 
rests on the research community who must provide 
evidence about the positive and negative effects and 
explain these effects to external constituencies, including 
policymakers. This group must collectively determine 
whether VAM use, given the consequences and issues 
identified above, warrant the financial, time, and human 
resource investments.75 Local and state departments of 
education typically have not (perhaps for political 
reasons) acknowledged or sought to examine the 
consequences of their policy actions. 
  
7. Intended Consequences 
 
As noted, the primary intended consequence of 
VAM use is to improve teaching and help teachers (and 
schools/districts) become better at educating students by 
measuring and then holding teachers accountable for 
their effects on students. The stronger the consequences, 
the stronger the motivation leading to stronger intended 
effects. Secondary intended consequences include 
                                               
74 Position Statement on High-Stakes Testing in Pre-K–12 
Education, AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N (2000), http://www.aera. 
net/About-AERA/AERA-Rules-Policies/Association-Policies/ 
Position-Statement-on-High-Stakes-Testing [https://perma.cc/ 
969R-8RMR]; see also STANDARDS, supra note 41.   
75 Arguably, some “reformers” assume that their ideas are 
inviolable and opposition is simply a reflection of a recalcitrant 
system, at best, or teachers’ unions at worst. See e.g., Michelle 
Rhee, Opting Out of Standardized Tests? Wrong Answer, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/michelle-rhee-opting-out-of-standardized-tests-wrong-
answer/2014/04/04/37a6e6a8-b8f9-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/JD5L-6APK] (suggesting that an 
organization she founded always keeps students’ interests first 
and also implying that teachers’ unions do not, especially in 
regards to the use of standardized tests).  
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replacing the nation’s antiquated teacher evaluation 
systems which have been criticized by all corners of the 
education research.76  
Yet, in practice, research evidence supporting 
whether VAM use has led to these intended consequences 
is suspect. Indeed, numerous studies have noted that 
there is a lack of evidence linking VAMs to improved 
teacher quality. First, VAM estimates have not produced 
useable information for teachers about how teachers, 
schools, and states might improve upon their instruction, 
or how all involved might collectively improve student 
learning and achievement over time.77 Likewise, recent 
evidence suggests the use of VAMs has not led to 
improvements in teacher evaluation systems.78 In sum, 
strong evidence suggest that VAMs have not promoted 
the intended benefits of providing actionable information 
for teachers to improve instruction or teacher evaluation 
systems. 
 
8. Unintended Consequences 
 
Simultaneously, ethical and research standards 
require that the use of testing data must also recognize 
VAMs’ unintended consequences.79 Policymakers must 
present evidence on whether VAMs cause unintended 
effects and if those effects outweigh their intended 
impact. This means that the educative goals at issue (e.g., 
increased student learning and achievement) should be 
                                               
76  See, e.g., DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE WIDGET EFFECT 
(2009) (criticizing the evaluation models that treat teachers as 
“widgets” and fail to recognize their differences and value). 
77 Henry Braun, The Value in Value-Added Depends on the 
Ecology, 44 EDUC. RES. 2 (2015); Corcoran, supra note 12. 
78 Matthew A. Kraft & Allison Gilmour, Revisiting the Widget 
Effect: Teacher Evaluation Reforms and the Distribution of 
Teacher Effectiveness, 46 EDUC. RES. 234–49 (2017). 
79 See AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N, supra note 74; STANDARDS, supra 
note 41. 
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examined alongside the positive and negative 
implications for both the science and ethics of using 
VAMs in practice.80  
Researchers have produced an exhaustive list of 
these unintended consequences.81 First, the use of VAMs 
leads to teacher isolation whereby teachers “literally or 
figuratively ‘close their classroom door’ and revert to 
working alone.”82 Sadly, teacher isolation is at cross-
purposes with collaboration among colleagues, 
something that is an essential part to improving 
schools.83 Second, the use of high-stakes testing causes 
teachers to leave the profession and avoid high-needs 
schools that most need the best teachers.84 Because of the 
very nature of VAM-based teacher evaluation which 
rewards testing achievement, teachers avoid teaching 
high-needs students. This is rational: if they perceive 
themselves to be at greater risk of teaching students who 
may be more likely to hinder their value-added85 they 
“seek safer [grade level, subject area, classroom, or 
school] assignments, where they can avoid the risk of low 
VAMS scores.”86 Of course, the flip side of this, teachers 
avoid challenging assignments or leave the profession all 
together.87 Third, and most troubling perhaps, is the 
dehumanization that high-stakes testing causes. Indeed, 
under such regimes, teachers view and react to students 
as “potential score increasers or score compressors,” not 
children.88 
 
                                               
80  Messick, supra note 47.  
81  See, e.g., Susan Moore Johnson, Will VAMS Reinforce the 
Walls of the Egg-Crate School?, 44 EDUC. RES. 117–26 (2015).  
82 Id. at 120. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Hewitt, supra note 61, at 32.  
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III. The Cases 
 
This section discusses cases where the central 
issue was the role VAMs played in adverse employment 
actions. It first traces those cases related to arguments 
grounded in the substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. It then 
highlights the series of cases where plaintiffs challenged 
the use of VAMs on jurisdictional grounds (i.e., that a 
particular government agency superseded its authority 
or other statutes in requiring the use of VAMs). The final 
subsection assesses the cases where process arguments 
have been advanced by the plaintiffs.  
 
A. Federal Substantive Due Process Rights & 
Equal Protection Arguments: VAMs May Be 
Unwise But Still Constitutional 
   
1. Cook v. Bennett  
 
 In 2015, a group of teachers challenged Florida’s 
use of student test scores to evaluate their job 
performance.89 As part of that state’s application for Race 
to the Top funds, the state legislature enacted a new 
teacher performance evaluation regimen in their law of 
teacher evaluation.90 Specifically, the legislature 
required that at least 50% of a teacher’s performance 
evaluation be based on student growth on state 
standardized tests in math and English (the Florida 
Comprehensive Assessment Test, or FCAT).91 The 
remaining portion of the teacher’s evaluation was 
                                               
89 Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). 
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.34 (West 2011). 
91 Id. A teacher’s final evaluation was based on the student test 
growth (the VAM rating) on the FCAT (50%) and a VAM rating 
based on the school’s contribution to a student’s growth. Cook, 
792 F.3d at 1297. 
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calculated based on a school-wide VAM rating.92 Not all 
students take the math and English tests. In fact, 
students took the English FCAT exam in grades 3 
through 10 and the mathematics FCAT exam in grades 3 
through 8.  
 Under the evaluation law, Florida teachers fell 
under one of three types of categories.93 “Type A” teachers 
were those that taught the tested subjects (math and 
English) in the years that the FCAT was administered 
for those subjects. In effect, as the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted, the model adopted by the state 
education commissioner only worked as designed in 
evaluating teachers of English in grades 4 through 10 
and math in grades 4 through 8.94 The rest of Florida’s 
public school teachers fell into two groups. “Type B” 
teachers taught students in grades 4 through 10, but in 
subjects other than English or math.95 “Type C” teachers 
taught students in grades below 4 or above 10 or their 
students did not take standardized tests (e.g., art).96  
 The thrust of the legal problem, according to the 
teachers challenging the evaluation scheme, related to 
the evaluation of Type B and C teachers. As a practical 
matter, school districts evaluated Type B teachers using 
student FCAT scores for math and English, 
notwithstanding the fact that those teachers did not 
instruct the students in those subjects.97 Type C teachers’ 
VAM scores were calculated based on school-wide FCAT 
scores derived from student scores in subjects they did 
not teach.98 Under this scenario, for example, a second 
                                               
92 Id.  
93 The district court designated the classification set forth in 
this discussion and, for ease of reference, the appeals court 
adopted it in its analysis.  
94 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1298. 
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grade art teacher’s VAM rating could be calculated based 
on a 3rd grade student’s math and English test growth.  
 The plaintiff-teachers argued that the evaluation 
laws violated the Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 
Because no fundamental right was at issue, the court 
applied the rational basis test to determine whether the 
government’s actions had a legitimate purpose and 
whether the chosen methods were rationally related to 
that purpose.100 Ultimately, the court sided with the 
government, finding that there was a legitimate interest 
which was to “increas[e] student academic performance 
by improving the quality of instructional, administrative, 
and supervisory services in the public schools of the 
state.”101  
The court also concluded that there was a rational 
relationship between this purpose and the use of the 
FCAT VAMs.102 The court concluded—and the plaintiffs 
conceded at oral argument—that the government “could 
have reasonably believed that (1) a teacher can improve 
student performance through his or her presence in a 
                                               
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in relevant part, that: “No 
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
100 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1300 (citing Fresenius Med. Care 
Holdings, Inc. v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2013); 
FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1993)).   
101 Id. at 1301 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1012.34(1)(a) (2013)); see also 
Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1182 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding 
that plaintiff’s substantive due process claims failed because 
“[e]ven accepting plaintiffs’ criticisms at face value, the loose 
constitutional standard of rationality allows governments to 
use blunt tools which may produce only marginal results.”). 
The Houston court, however, ruled that the plaintiff’s 
allegations of procedural due process violations survived 
summary judgment dismissal. Id. at 1183.  
102 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301. 
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school and (2) the FCAT VAM can measure those school-
wide performance improvements, even if the model was 
not designed to do so.”103 To be sure, both the appellate 
and district courts criticized the chosen model.104 
The court similarly applied the rational basis 
review to dismiss the equal protection claims.105 Under 
this claim, the teachers argued that the evaluation law 
created a separate class of teachers: “those whose 
evaluations are based on student growth data for 
students assigned to the teacher in the subjects taught 
by the teacher, and those whose evaluations are based on 
student growth data for students and/or subjects they do 
not teach.”106 However, because this classification did not 
implicate a suspect class (e.g., race, gender) rational basis 
applied and, under the same line of reasoning of the 
substantive due process claim, the equal protection claim 
was dismissed.107 
  
  
                                               
103 Id.   
104 Id. at 1301 (noting that “[w]hile the FCAT VAM may not be 
the best method—or may even be a poor one—for achieving this 
goal, it is still rational to think that the challenged evaluation 
procedures would advance the government's stated purpose.”). 
The district court in finding for the government concluded, in 
dicta, that “[t]he unfairness of the evaluation system as 
implemented is not lost on this Court” and that “this Court 
would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would find this 
evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let alone be 
willing to submit to a similar evaluation system.” Cook v. 
Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1215–16 (N.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d 
sub nom. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).  
105 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301. 
106 Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213. 
107 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (internal citations 
omitted)).  
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2. Trout v. Knox County Board of Education 
 
 Plaintiff teachers in Trout v. Knox County Board 
of Education brought substantive and procedural due 
process claims based on their evaluations that used 
VAMs for purposes of teacher evaluations.108 In Trout, 
the teachers challenged the use of Tennessee’s VAM 
rating (the EVAAS). Specifically, two teachers (one a 
math teacher and the other a science teacher) were 
denied bonuses based on their VAM rating.109 
 Both teachers involved (Trout and Taylor, 
respectively) argued that the use of the VAMs was 
arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, could not be 
sustained under the rational basis test. Echoing 
criticisms of the reliability and validity of VAMs,110 the 
plaintiffs argued that the VAMs were too imprecise to be 
used to assess their effectiveness111 and therefore 
violated substantive due process rights. 
 The federal district court ruled in favor of the 
government. It began its analysis by noting that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process 
claim.112 By way of background, a substantive due 
process claim requires that there be some property 
interest at stake. Here, under an analysis of property 
interest rights in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have an 
interest in bonuses.113 
 For sake of argument, however, the court went on 
to apply the rational test and found that the 
government’s use of the VAMs in this case satisfied that 
                                               
108 Trout v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 163 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 
(E.D. Tenn. 2016). 
109 Id.   
110 See supra Part I. 
111 Trout, 163 F.Supp. 3d at 500. 
112 Id.  
113 Id at 501. 
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test.114 The use of VAMs to identify and support 
instruction to lead to increased student achievement was 
not in dispute as a legitimate government interest.115 The 
plaintiffs, similar to Cook v. Bennett,116 argued that 
various statistical infirmities made reliance on VAMs 
irrational, however.117 In rejecting these arguments, the 
district court noted, among other things, that there was 
no legal authority requiring the court to apply a standard 
with respect to the confidence level of a test.118  
 To be sure, the Trout court was sympathetic to the 
plaintiffs’ complaints regarding the statistical 
inadequacy of the VAMs.119 Yet, at bottom, there was no 
legal authority that required the court to apply a certain 
level of statistical confidence with respect to the 
government’s chosen method for purposes of measuring 
teacher effectiveness.120 
 
  
                                               
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 503. 
116 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297.  
117 For example, the plaintiffs took issue with the confidence 
level of the statistical test (68%). Trout, 163 F.Supp. 3d at 503. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 504 (writing that the Court notes that Plaintiffs' 
criticisms of the statistical methods of TVAAS are not 
unfounded.)               
120 Id. at 504–05. The court wrote that while “[p]laintiffs 
bemoan the statistical imprecision of TVAAS,” no legal 
authority “support[s] the proposition that the United States 
Constitution requires legislative decision making regarding 
the use of statistics to require ‘statistically significant’ results. 
Absent controlling authority to the contrary, this Court refuses 
to extend the rational basis test this far—where no suspect 
class or fundamental right is at issue, the Constitution 
requires a rational basis, not a statistically significant basis, 
for the law in question.” Id.  
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3. Wagner v. Haslam 
 
 Another set of teachers in Tennessee challenged 
the use of VAMs in Wagner v. Haslam.121 Pursuant to 
state and district evaluation policies, teachers of non-
tested subjects were evaluated based on school wide data 
of student performance on test subjects.122 Similar to 
Cook v. Bennett, the teachers claimed that this practice 
violated the substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution.123 
 The federal court, however, echoing the decisions 
of other federal courts assessing similar claims, rejected 
the teachers’ arguments. With respect to the substantive 
due process claim, the court enumerated several reasons 
why the policies at issue passed constitutional muster. It 
noted that “the State Board could rationally believe that 
a school-wide score provides some measure (albeit a crude 
one) of evaluating an individual teacher’s 
performance.”124 The court also added that the legislature 
had continued to amend its teacher evaluation laws to 
address some of the concerns raised by the plaintiffs.125  
While the Wagner court concluded that the use of 
VAMs was constitutional, it expressed concerns over 
fairness similar to those found in Cook and Trout. Indeed, 
the Wagner court wrote that although the current 
evaluation processes may produce “unfair results” for 
certain teachers, it did not rise to the level of being 
irrational.126 At the same time, the court was explicit 
about its use of judicial restraint, especially with respect 
to education policy questions. Indeed, subject to limited 
                                               
121 112 F. Supp. 3d 673 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).                   
122 Id.  
123 See Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297. 
124 Wagner, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 694 (emphasis added). 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 695. 
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exceptions,127 the states have “unfettered”128 discretion to 
regulate education, and state legislators can make both 
“excellent decisions and terrible decisions,” so long as 
there is some “modicum of rationality.”129 Put another 
way, a court may disagree with the policy choice of a 
governing body, but it is not the role of the courts to 
second-guess policy judgments of elected officials.130 
 
4. Matter of Lederman v. King  
 
 The one extant case that succeeded in 
demonstrating the government’s use of VAMs rose to the 
high bar of arbitrary and capricious is found in Matter of 
Lederman v. King.131 In this case, a well-regarded 
veteran teacher who had previously had positive 
evaluations received an “ineffective” review under New 
York’s new evaluation system.132 This new system 
required the use of VAMs. The teacher, Sheryl 
Lederman, submitted “overwhelming” and ample 
evidence from experts in the field that the court 
concluded satisfied her burden in the record before the 
court.133 
 In contrast, the court noted that state defendants 
left numerous statistical issues unaddressed, including 
the potential VAM biases against teachers with high-
                                               
127 Some exceptions, of course, would include the use of race to 
segregate schools. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 
483 (1954).  
128 Id. at 692. 
129 Id. at 693. 
130 But see PAIGE, supra note 9 (arguing that for scholars of 
educational policy the appropriate question is determining 
which institutions—courts, legislatures, or markets—have the 
capacity to best address a particular policy need in education, 
like teacher evaluation). 
131 Lederman v. King, 54 Misc. 3d 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).       
132 Id. at 888.  
133 Id. at 897–98. 
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performing students.134Critically, how Mrs. Lederman’s 
scores swung so wildly from the second-highest level of 
effective all the way to the lowest level of ineffective in a 
single year with statistically similar scoring students, 
among others.135 In sum, the court was constrained to the 
record before it and, on that evidence, found Ms. 
Lederman satisfied her burden.136                 
 
B. Legislative State Agency Authority 
Questioned 
 
 Litigants have also challenged the use of VAMs in 
teacher evaluation on jurisdictional grounds. In these 
cases, organizations (typically unions) have argued that 
a legislative or executive agency exceeded their 
respective authority in requiring VAMs for purposes of 
evaluation or high-stakes employment decisions. These 
cases are discussed below. 
 
1. Leff v. Clark County School District 
 
 At issue in Leff v. Clark County School District 
was the constitutionality of changes made to state laws 
governing teacher evaluation and post-probationary (or 
continuing contract) status.137 By way of background, up 
until 2011, a teacher who completed a probationary 
period of employment (three years) and was subsequently 
rehired by a school district received post-probationary 
status.138  Post-probationary status conferred to a teacher 
certain procedural protections should they face 
termination and required that termination be “for 
                                               
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 898. 
137 Leff v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1244–
45 (D. Nev. 2016). 
138 Id. at 1245. 
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cause.”139 In contrast, probationary teachers could be 
non-renewed without cause and did not have similar 
procedural protections.  
 In 2011, the Nevada legislature changed its 
teacher evaluation and post-probationary statutes. In 
particular, it required that VAMs be used as part of 
teacher evaluations. The legislature also required that if 
a post-probationary teacher achieved two negative 
evaluations, they would revert back to probationary 
teacher status.140 Put another way, a teacher could lose 
the protections (e.g., a teacher’s termination could only 
be for “cause”) because of the changes to the state 
statutes. 
 Teachers contested the changes based on the 
federal Constitution’s Contracts Clause.141 That clause, 
in relevant part, reads as follows:  “No State shall . . . 
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts[.]”142 In essence, the post-probationary 
teachers claimed that they had a binding contract with 
the state once they achieved post-probationary status.  In 
exchange for meeting the demands of satisfactory 
performance, the state had agreed to give them 
procedural protections and the only grounds for 
termination were cause. By passing the 2011 amendment 
that tied teacher contract status to teacher evaluations 
(that incorporated VAMs), the state breached the 
contract, something not permitted under the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 The federal court declined to adopt the teachers’ 
position and held that the statute prior to 2011 did not 
create a contractual obligation between the state and 
teachers. In its analysis, the court determined that there 
is a strong presumption in law against the idea that a 
                                               
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1244. 
142 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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legislative action creates a private contract.143 Absent 
any expression of the legislature that they were creating 
a contract, it is generally assumed that typical legislative 
activity simply reflects a policy determination that can be 
changed.144 Accordingly, the teachers’ claim that the 
state legislature exceeded its authority with the 
statutory amendments failed. 
 
2. Stapleton v. Skandera 
 
 In Stapleton v. Skandera, teachers challenged the 
use of VAMs in teacher evaluation on several 
jurisdictional grounds related to statutory and agency 
authority.145 By way of brief background, the New Mexico 
legislature attempted—but failed—to make several 
amendments to its existing teacher evaluation laws in 
2012. Notwithstanding this, the New Mexico Department 
of Education Secretary (through the Department) 
promulgated new regulations relative to the evaluation 
of teachers.146 The teachers sought judicial relief in that 
the court would suspend the use of the regulations.147 
 The teachers argued that the Secretary exceeded 
her authority—that, in effect, she acted in a legislative 
capacity. They raised particular objection to the 
incorporation of VAMs in teacher evaluation, arguing 
that such a move could only be done by way of legislative 
action because it represented a shift in public policy 
under exclusive legislative purview.148 However, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals sided with the Department on 
                                               
143 Leff, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 1246–47 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 
465–66.) 
144 Id. 
145 Stapleton v. Skandera, 346 P.3d 1191, 1194 (N.M. App. 
2015). 
146 Id. at 1193 (citing N.M. CODE R. § 6.69.8). 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 1194. 
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this issue. It noted that the enabling statute required 
only that the Department enact evaluation regulations 
that were “uniform statewide” and “highly objective.”149 
Accordingly, the legislature left the Secretary “broad 
authority” to enact regulations reflecting these 
requirements and, in the view of the court, including 
VAMs in teacher evaluation protocol did not exceed her 
authority.150 
 The teachers in Stapleton raised other claims 
related to agency authority. In particular, they raised two 
additional objections. They contended the new 
departmental regulations permitted “assistant 
principals” to observe teachers which violated the state 
evaluation law that only gave such authority to 
“principals.”151 Similarly, they argued that the provisions 
in the regulations that exempted charter schools from 
coverage of the evaluations violated the state law 
requirement that the Department enact a system of 
“uniform” evaluation.152 
 The court of appeals rejected both of the 
arguments. With respect to the first claim (that only 
principals could observe teachers), the court read the 
state statute as allowing others to observe teachers, 
including assistant principals. The court wrote, “We 
agree with the district court that the regulation does not 
necessarily conflict with the statute because the statute 
‘mandates the participation of school principals [but] 
does not limit the persons who may [also] observe 
[teachers].’”153  Regarding the claim that the regulations 
inappropriately exempted charter schools, the state court 
of appeals noted that the state Charter School Act 
specifically allowed the Department to waive certain 
                                               
149 Id. at 1195 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19(A) (1978)). 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1196. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. (alterations in original). 
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regulations normally applicable to public schools.154  
Because the teachers could not cite to any other legal 
authority that suggested the waiver was not permitted 
under the Charter School Act, this theory was also 
rejected.155 
 
3. Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State 
 
In Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State, a 
teacher’s union challenged Louisiana’s enactment, 
amendment, and repeal of multiple state laws related to 
public education, including those related to teacher 
evaluation requirements.156 During the 2012 legislative 
sessions, the state legislature amended and re-enacted 
nine different statutes, enacted two new distinct 
statutes, and repealed twenty-eight statutes all related 
to education.157  
The plaintiffs alleged that these actions, which all 
occurred through one legislative act, violated the state 
constitution’s “single object” requirement.158 That 
requirement stipulates that the legislature enacts bills 
that have “one object” and that various pieces of a bill 
must have a relationship to one another.159 The teachers 
argued that the bill contained unrelated subjects, such as 
the changes to teacher evaluation, reduction in force 
issues, rules governing contracts with superintendents, 
among others.160  
Louisiana’s supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
arguments.161 The court began its assessment by noting 
                                               
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 1196–97. 
156 La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 171 So. 3d 835, 841 (La. 
2014). 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 838. 
159 Id. at 841.  
160 Id. at 842. 
161 Id. at 851. 
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that there is a general presumption that a legislature’s 
acts satisfy the “one object” rule.162 It also noted that the 
purpose of the rule was to prevent “logrolling,” or the 
practice of packaging many measures into one bill 
because any of those measures, alone, would not pass the 
legislature.163 The court noted that under such a “grave 
and palpable” scenario, the legislature would violate the 
single object rule.164 Yet, in this case, the court concluded 
that the object of the act at issue “is improving 
elementary and secondary education through tenure 
reform and performance standards based on 
effectiveness.”165 The court concluded that various 
components of that bill could be broadly related to this 
objective.166 
 
4. Robinson v. Stewart  
 
Another Florida case, Robinson v. Stewart,167 also 
involved a challenge to the authority of the state Board 
of Education to implement teacher evaluation 
regulations using VAMs.168 In Robinson, the plaintiffs 
sought to declare the 2011 Student Success Act 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it impermissibly 
delegated legislative control over public education to the 
executive branch.169 The act revised teacher evaluation 
procedures and required the use of “student learning 
growth measures” (or VAMs) to evaluate teachers and 
make significant employment decisions, such as 
tenure.170 The act left it to the Department of Education 
                                               
162 Id. at 845. 
163 Id. at 845–46. 
164 Id. at 851. 
165 Id. at 850. 
166 Id.  
167 161 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
168Id.at 590–91. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 591.  
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Commissioner (the executive branch) to develop the 
formula to achieve these goals171 and required the use of 
standardized test scores.172 
The Florida District Court of Appeals rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the legislature, in requiring the 
Commissioner to develop the formula, violated the non-
delagability doctrine of the state constitution that 
ensures a separation of powers.173 Its analysis noted that 
the plaintiffs carried a high burden of proof: that the 
legislature’s action violated the doctrine “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” the highest standard of proof under 
the law.174 The court further interpreted the act as simply 
requiring the Commissioner to provide technical 
implementation support, as opposed to allowing the 
executive to make policy determinations.175  
 
5. Filed but not Adjudicated  
 
Another case that deserves some attention as it 
also related to a claim that a state agency exceeded its 
authority by incorporating VAMs in evaluating teachers. 
In Texas Teachers Association v. Texas Education Agency, 
the Texas Department of Education adopted teacher 
                                               
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 592.  
173 Id. at 590–91. 
174 Id. at 591.  
175 Id. at 592.  But see id. at 597 (Benton, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the legislature “has conferred on the State Board of 
Education power to designate some of them—perhaps nearly 
all of them—professionally ‘unsatisfactory,’ and therefore, 
among other things, subject to being laid off, for reasons that 
are so unclear and indefinite that the Legislature has 
abandoned its responsibility to set public policy in this 
important area, and delegated legislative authority it should 
have exercised itself to the State Board of Education, an 
executive branch agency.”) 
39
Paige et al.: Tennessee's National Impact on Teacher Evaluation Law & Policy
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2019
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2 
 
[562] 
evaluation regulations requiring the use of VAMs.176 
Numerous plaintiffs, including teachers’ unions, sought 
to enjoin the use of VAMs on the grounds that the 
regulations exceeded the power vested in the state 
Department of Education.177 The case settled and the 
state ultimately agreed to eliminate the required use of 
VAMs in teacher evaluation regulations.178 
In New Mexico ex rel Stewart v. New Mexico 
Public Education Department, a group of plaintiffs 
consisting of legislators, unions, and teachers filed a 
complaint on the grounds that the state Department of 
Education improperly infringed other state laws when it 
promulgated its teacher evaluation regulations.179 
Plaintiffs argued that the School Personnel Act provides 
for the processes associated with teacher evaluation and 
termination.180  
Similarly, plaintiffs allege that the Department’s 
regulation conflicts with New Mexico’s Public 
                                               
176 Sean Collins Walsh, Union Sues to Block Texas Teacher 
Evaluation Change, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, (Aug. 13. 2016), 
https://www.statesman.com/news/20160813/union-sues-to-
block-texas-teacher-evaluation-change [https://perma.cc/MQ 
C2-FATW].  
177 Id.  
178 Melissa B. Taboada, Lawsuit Settled: Texas Teacher 
Appraisals Won’t Be Tied to STAAR Scores, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN (last updated Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.statesman.com/news/20170504/lawsuit-settled-
texas-teacher-appraisals-wont-be-tied-to-staar-scores 
[https://perma.cc/XP3C-H2WB]. 
179 Complaint, State ex rel Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 
No. D-101-CV-2015-00409 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/nm-complaint-
teacherevals_1114.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T99-FG89]. The 
plaintiffs also claim substantive and procedural due process 
violations.  
180 See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19(D) (2010) (providing 
that evaluations should be determined in part by how well 
professional development was carried out).  
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Employment Bargaining Law (the state’s enabling 
collective bargaining statute) that governs “the terms 
and conditions of employment.”181 More specifically, that 
law provides that local school districts must negotiate 
terms and conditions of employment with the 
representative union.182 The case is pending with various 
motions before the court.183 
 
C. Process & “Fundamental Fairness” Cases 
 
1. Houston Federation of Teachers 
 
 A group of Houston teachers sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief in the case of Houston Federation of 
Teachers v. Houston Independent School District.184 At 
issue for the court was the constitutional protections 
afforded teachers in the instance where the Houston 
public school districts used VAMs to rate and make 
employment decisions for its teachers.185 The Houston 
Independent School District (HISD) had contracted with 
a third-party vendor who had created certain algorithms 
to classify and rate teachers based on their students’ test 
performance.186  This third party vendor, citing trade 
secrecy, refused to reveal the algorithms when they were 
requested for review by the teachers.187 Therefore, 
teachers who faced adverse employment consequences 
                                               
181 Complaint at 31, Stewart, No. D-101-CV-2015-00409. 
182 See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17 (New Mexico’s 
Public Employment Labor Relations Statute).  
183 See Motion for Summary Judgment Filed in New Mexico 
Teacher Evaluation Lawsuit, (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www. 
krwg.org/post/motion-summary-judgment-filed-new-mexico-
teacher-evaluation-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/R8CU-DYHN].  
184 Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174 (S.D. Tex. 2017).  
185 Id. at 1171. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1172. 
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could not review the underlying formulas that 
contributed to these decisions.188 
 The teachers claimed that the use of the value 
added models constituted violation of the substantive and 
procedural due process clauses of the Constitution.189 
Repeating a line of reasoning in Cook v. Bennett, and 
other cases, the federal district court ruled that the 
district’s use of VAMs did not amount to a substantive 
due process violation.190 The court concluded the 
following: “Even accepting plaintiffs’ criticisms at face 
value, the loose constitutional standard of rationality 
allows governments to use blunt tools which may produce 
only marginal results. HISD’s motion for summary 
judgment on this substantive due process claim is 
granted.”191  
 Yet the court found in favor of the plaintiffs’ 
procedural due process claims.192 The court’s analysis is 
instructive because it relied heavily on procedural due 
process as ensuring fundamental fairness.193 The court 
wrote:   
 
“[The] purpose of procedural due process is to 
convey to the individual a feeling that the 
government has dealt with him fairly, as well as 
to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of 
protected interests.” [] In short, due process is 
designed to foster government decision-making 
that is both fair and accurate.194 
 
                                               
188 Id. at 1172–73. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1181–82. 
191 Id. at 1182.  
192 Id. at 1180.  
193 Id.   
194 Id. at 1176 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978)). 
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The court then listed the factors required for procedural 
due process to be satisfied in the case of a teacher 
termination in Texas.195 Of particular note was that a 
teacher facing termination must “be advised of the cause 
for his termination in sufficient detail so as to enable him 
to show any error that may exist.”196  
 Teachers contended—and the court agreed—that 
they were not being afforded due process protections 
because the school district violated the requirement that 
afforded a teacher “sufficient detail” to show that there 
may be an error in the government’s decision.197 Because 
the district’s third party vendor would not release the 
underlying formulas, teachers could not possibly assess 
the accuracy of the district’s value-added rating.198 
 The court listed numerous potential errors that 
could be revealed if inspection of the formulas was 
permitted.199 As the court stated: “The [] score “might be 
erroneously calculated for any number of reasons, 
ranging from data-entry mistakes to glitches in the 
computer code itself. . . . HISD has acknowledged that 
mistakes can occur in calculating a teacher’s EVAAS 
score . . . .”200 The court was troubled by the district’s 
stipulation that it could not correct a single teacher’s 
score, even if an error was found, because correcting one 
score would alter the results of all other teachers.201  
                                               
195 Id. 
196 Id. The court also noted that a teacher facing termination 
must be afforded: “the names and testimony of the witnesses 
against him; [] a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own 
defense within a reasonable time; [] and a hearing before a 
tribunal that possesses some academic expertise and an 
apparent impartiality toward the charges.” Id. (citing Ferguson 
v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).  
197 Id. at 1176–77 (citing Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 759 
F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985)).  
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 1177. 
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 1178.  
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Indeed, it is worth recalling that value added 
scores are comparative in nature, assessing one teacher 
against others.202  This means that, if one teacher’s score 
is adjusted for an error, it alters all others.203 The court 
characterized the underlying foundation of the VAM 
ratings as built upon a “house of cards.”204 Accordingly, it 
denied the school district’s summary judgment claim 
with respect to procedural due process.205 
 
2. Washington Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Public 
Schools 
 
 The collective bargaining forum has also been 
another forum wherein teachers have successfully 
appealed the use of VAMs in teacher evaluations. By way 
of background, collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) 
provide for a process (grievance arbitration), to redress 
violations of the contract. This arbitration process can be 
important, especially when a contract calls for certain 
specifications concerning how teacher evaluations can be 
conducted. Indeed, districts’ decisions to non-renew or 
terminate a teacher for performance have been called 
into question because a district fails to follow 
contractually mandated processes.206 With some limited 
                                               
202 Id. at 1172. 
203 Id. at 1177. 
204 Id. at 1178.  
205 Id. at 1180. To be sure, procedural due process claims made 
in Wagner v. Haslam, see supra notes 121129 and 
accompanying discussion, did not survive. However, at issue in 
that case was whether the teachers' bonuses could be linked to 
their VAM scores. Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 673, 688 
(M.D. Tenn. 2015). In that context, the court concluded that 
bonuses were not a property interest sufficient to trigger due 
process protections. Id. at 698.   
206 See, e.g., Dennis Yarmouth Teachers v. Dennis Yarmouth 
Reg’l Sch. Dist, 360 N.E.3d 883, 884–885 (1977) (reversing a 
school district’s decision to non-renew a probationary teacher 
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exceptions, scholarship has omitted consideration of the 
value and importance of collective bargaining 
agreements in relation to legal challenges to the use of 
VAMs in teacher evaluations.207 
 Cases emerging from Washington, D.C., illustrate 
this theme. In Washington, a teacher’s union grieved the 
public district’s performance ratings based on VAMs of 
hundreds of teachers. As an initial matter, the school 
district challenged whether the issue could, in fact, be 
subject to the grievance arbitration procedures in the 
contract. Indeed, as a general matter, disputes are 
subject to the grievance process only if both parties 
agreed to arbitrate the dispute under the CBA.208  
In Washington Teachers’ Union, a lower court had 
concluded that the district’s final evaluation decisions 
made under the evaluation systems were not arbitrable 
but the district’s use of evaluation procedures under the 
collective bargaining was, in fact, arbitrable.209 Put 
another way, the parties did not, under the CBA, agree 
to arbitrate disputes over the judgment of the teachers’ 
final performance, but they did agree to arbitrate 
whether or not the evaluation procedures outlined were 
                                               
because school district violated terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement that specified evaluation processes).  
207 But see PAIGE, supra note 9, at 63–73 (arguing the use of 
VAMs is susceptible to the grievance arbitration process and 
the failures of VAMs to accurately assess teacher effectiveness 
could be remedied through the collective bargaining process.); 
see also Mark A. Paige, Applying the Paradox Theory: A Law 
and Policy Analysis of Collective Bargaining Rights and 
Teacher Evaluation Reform From Selected States, 2013 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 21, 41–42 (highlighting the benefits of a more 
collaborative collective bargaining process understood as 
“interest-based” bargaining particularly with respect to 
teacher evaluation). 
208  Wash. Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Pub. Schs., 77 A.3d 441 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) 
209 Id. at 444. 
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followed.210 On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision that the district’s final 
judgments were not arbitrable. However, the school 
district did not challenge the lower court’s determination 
that the issue of whether the district followed evaluation 
procedures was subject to evaluation.211  
In at least one other well-publicized case, the 
Washington Teachers’ Union succeeded in frustrating 
the D.C. Public Schools use of the IMPACT evaluation 
system.212 In this case, the union alleged that the school 
district violated various evaluation procedures when they 
terminated a seventeen year veteran teacher, Thomas 
O’Rourke, under the district’s evaluation procedures.213 
As noted above, the controlling courts in the District of 
Columbia have concluded that “process arguments” 
under the collective bargaining agreement are arbitrable, 
although the school district’s final judgment with respect 
to evaluation categorization (e.g., ineffective, 
satisfactory, etc.) is not. 
In the District of Columbia Public Schools matter, 
the arbitrator found that the district violated evaluation 
procedures governing the length of observation visits, 
which, according to the contract, should be “at least 30 
minutes.”214 In this case, the administrators evaluating 
the teacher exceeded that length by substantial amounts 
(e.g., observations lasted 80 minutes), which, in the eyes 
of the arbitrator, amounted to a procedural violation of 
evaluation processes.215 Importantly, the arbitrator noted 
                                               
210 Id.  
211 Id.  
212  D.C. Pub. Sch. v. Wash. Teachers Union, Local 6, AAA No. 
16-20-1300-0499 AVH (Feigenbaum, Arb.); see also Perry 
Stein, Teachers Union Touts Victory in Evaluation Fight WASH. 
POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
education/wp/2016/04/05/teachers-union-touts-victory-in-
evaluation-fight/ [https://perma.cc/P7RU-PSP7].  
213 D.C. Pub. Schs., AAA No. 16-20-1300-0499 AVH. 
214 Id. at 26–28.  
215 Id. at 18. 
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two other significant factual findings to his decision. He 
concluded that the administrator evaluating the teacher 
had a reputation of using the observation system to 
penalize teachers “he did not like.”216 A school district 
administrator, as well, testified that an observation that 
exceeded or did not meet the thirty minute threshold 
would amount to a process violation.217 In sum, and under 
these circumstances, therefore, procedural violations 
could be seen as simply pretext for terminating a 
teacher.218 
In arbitration cases, the remedy for a bargaining 
violation can be a contested issue. In Washington, D.C., 
an arbitrator cannot issue a remedy in the form of 
recategorizing a teacher’s evaluation from ineffective to 
effective.219 Reinstatement and back pay, however, are 
typical arbitration remedies,220 and these were, in fact, 
used in the case. 
 
IV. Current Policy Landscape in Wake of ESSA 
 
This section discusses the current policy 
landscape following the reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 by 
Congressional passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA) of 2015. It illustrates that the ESSA 
reauthorization allowed for more state-level flexibility 
with regards to VAM use. It then highlights how the new 
policies have essentially shifted the emphasis from VAMs 
                                               
216 Id. at 19. 
217 Id. at 7.  
218 Id. at 19.  
219 Wash. Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 77 A.3d 441, 458 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
220 See e.g., DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION ch. 
13.I.A. (Norman Brand & Melissa Birens, eds., 3d ed.) (noting 
that back-pay and reinstatement are two essential remedies for 
making an employee whole).  
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in high stakes decision making to, perhaps, other ways of 
measurement.   
 
A. ESSA Reauthorization 
 
In 2015, Congress passed a reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act under a new 
name, the Every Student Succeeds Act.221 In general, 
ESSA reduced some federal mandates and incentives tied 
to accountability system effectively limiting some of the 
federal control promoted by RttT and other waiver 
requirements.222 Specifically, ESSA allowed state 
departments of education two main changes: (a) ESSA 
gave state departments leniency to interpret key terms 
like, “including, as a significant factor, data on student 
growth for all students,” and (b) ESSA gave state 
departments more control to determine state goals and 
measures for success with a federal framework.223 Put 
simply, ESSA allowed more flexibility.  
To break down the policy changes further, the first 
main change, allowing states to interpret “data on 
student growth” differently, allowed state departments of 
education to step back from the statistically-based 
measures of student growth such as VAMs. ESSA 
allowed states to use some measures which could include 
qualitative measures as data showing student growth, 
such as student learning objectives (SLOs), which are 
objectives for the growth of students developed at the 
beginning of the year by teachers (sometimes in 
conjunction with others).224  
SLOs still rely on evidence which can still include 
VAM scores, but the evidence can also include course 
                                               
221 Every Students Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95 § 
114 Stat. 1177 (2015).  
222 Race to the Top Act of 2011, S. Res. 844, 112th Cong. (2011).  
223 ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2012), 
https://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility [https://perma.cc/95A7-FLFA]. 
224 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 18. 
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exams, performance demonstrations, and other types of 
evidence. In short, ESSA allowed states to incorporate 
more nuanced and qualitative measures of student 
growth without removing the requirement that states 
must use evidence of student growth. The distinction is 
small but significant. It signals a redefinition of “data” to 
include information beyond large standardized testing 
(although, importantly, it can still include these test 
scores).  
The second main change, allowing states to set 
their own goals and measures for success, marks a 
backing away from the strict adequate yearly progress 
(AYP) goals established by NCLB. Although states still 
must meet AYP for certain subgroups of students, the 
consequences and the interventions that must be 
imposed can be decided by the states themselves. 
Essentially, ESSA removes the punitive bite 
demonstrated previously by NCLB, the bite that 
encouraged many states to apply for waivers and adopt 
VAMs in the first place, and replaces it with flexibility. 
States choose their own bite now. The standards remain, 
but the consequence, the type of intervention required for 
a failure to meet AYP, is decided by state departments of 
education. 
These two changes, though small, rolled back 
some of the features that encouraged, or forced, states to 
use large standardized statewide systems that leaned on 
VAM results to measure teacher achievement.225 The 
new policy meant states did not need to create large-scale 
comparable data about teacher achievement. States no 
longer needed to structure their systems top-down and 
could allow for more bottom-up control, essentially 
handing more control to local educational authorities 
such as school districts. ESSA marked a shift of power. 
The federal government loosened reigns on state 
                                               
225 Cindy Long, Six Ways ESSA Will Improve Assessments, 
NEATODAY (2016), http://neatoday.org/2016/03/10/essa-
assessments/ [https://perma.cc/92AW-UC6A]. 
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departments of education, who, in turn, had the freedom 
to deviate from establishing one-size-fits-all teacher 
evaluation systems across their state, handing more of 
the power to make decisions to local educational 
authorities, such as districts.  
 
B. State Plans  
 
Though ESSA allowed for many of the changes 
stated above, it did not require or guarantee these 
changes. The work of exercising the flexibility was for the 
states, not the federal government. Hence, this section on 
state plans reveals how state teacher evaluation plans 
changed as a whole after the passage of ESSA through 
state legislative and regulatory action. The changes, as 
expected, trend toward less use of VAMs in high-stakes 
decision making, though the trend is somewhat muted. 
 In general, less states are currently using growth 
models or VAMs for teacher evaluation. The percentage 
dropped from 42% in 2014 to 30% in 2018.226 However, 
that percentage drop fails to highlight the magnitude of 
change. The study showing that the percentage 
decreased measured whether some states currently use 
or, importantly, endorse statewide use of VAMs. Some of 
these states endorse VAMs but allow for local educational 
authorities to avoid VAMs completely. For example, 
Maine, encourages the use of VAMs, but offers two 
models from which local education authorities can 
choose, one of which measures student growth with 
SLOs, not VAMs.227 In this case, VAMs play a role in the 
state’s teacher evaluation process, but, ultimately, the 
choice is made locally. This represents a major departure 
from the trend of heavy-handed state teacher evaluation 
systems before the passage of ESSA.  
 Additionally, some states have maintained their 
VAMs but use them in novel ways. North Carolina still 
                                               
226 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 12.  
227 Id. at 13.  
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uses a VAM, called EVAAS, which featured heavily in 
many of the lawsuits.228 However, the state does not use 
the results to make high-stakes decisions. Rather, North 
Carolina uses and reports the scores to foster 
professional development.229 In other words, the state 
does not shy from using VAM data as a part of their 
system, but they do shy from using VAMs for 
consequential decisions such as tenure decisions and 
others. 
 Additionally, and of note, recent state plans 
demonstrate increased focus on formative feedback 
practices compared to state plans collected in 2012, with 
31 of 51 education plans stating that their evaluation 
systems use formative data.230 This shift indicates a 
significant change in the stated values present in this 
new set of state documents. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
Quite apart from what education scholars and 
policymakers believe with respect to the merits of added 
models, all would likely agree that their introduction has 
had significant consequences. Of course, there is 
widespread disagreement with respect to how these 
statistical models should be used. Teachers and unions 
seeking to block the use of VAMs in high-stakes 
employment decisions have sought judicial relief with 
mixed success. That said, while courts may uphold the 
use of VAMs under a rational basis test, they are suspect 
about the wisdom of using VAMs to make significant 
decisions with respect to teacher employment status.  
But that does not mean that VAMs should be 
relegated to the dustbin of educational policy history. 
They may have important contributions to improving 
teacher quality. They may be important “flags” for 
                                               
228 See Hewitt, supra note 61, at 32. 
229 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 14. 
230 Id.   
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teachers, alerting them to investigate their practice a bit 
further. VAMs may, someday, play an important role in 
helping teachers.  
Importantly, however, the use of VAMs must be 
judicious, especially in light of their severe limitations. 
VAMs cannot tell a teacher what causes a particular 
result (the type of robust and actionable feedback a 
teacher would want) and they are highly sensitive to 
demographics and variables outside of a teacher’s control. 
Yet, because VAMs were incorporated in high-stakes 
decisions with such haste, especially with the impetus of 
the Race to the Top, they were brought to scale, warts 
and all.  
Thankfully, states have a rare opportunity in 
educational policy to take a bit more control over their 
destiny under the Every Student Succeeds Act. They 
can—and are—placing VAMs as a piece of a puzzle to 
solve teacher quality issues. Many are beginning to adopt 
laws and policies that minimize or eliminate their use in 
high-stakes employment. That is a step in the right 
direction, one that recognizes a relative value to VAMs in 
the larger quest to improve public education.  
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